We extend the language of the classical syllogisms with the sentenceforms "At most 1 p is a q" and "More than 1 p is a q". We show that the resulting logic does not admit a finite set of syllogism-like rules whose associated derivation relation is sound and complete, even when reductio ad absurdum is allowed.
Introduction
By the classical syllogistic, we understand the set of English sentences of the forms No p is a q Some p is a q Every p is a q Some p is not a q,
where p and q are common (count) nouns. By the extended classical syllogistic, we understand the classical syllogistic together with the set of quasi-English sentences of the forms Every non-p is a q Some non-p is not a q.
It is known that there exists a sound and complete proof system for the classical syllogistic in the form of a finite set of syllogism-like proof-rules (Smiley, 1973 , Corcoran, 1972 . Such a proof system also exists for the extended classical syllogistic; moreover, in both cases, reductio ad absurdum-in other words, the strategy of indirect proof-can be dispensed with (Pratt-Hartmann and Moss, 2009 ). The satisfiability problem for either of these languages is easily seen to be NLogSpace-complete, by a routine reduction to (and from) the problem 2-SAT. Both the classical syllogistic and its extended variant may be equivalently reformulated using the numerical quantifiers "At most 0 . . . " and "More than 0 . . . ". The forms of the classical syllogistic thus become, respectively At most 0 ps are qs More than 0 ps are qs At most 0 ps are not qs More than 0 ps are not qs,
while the additional forms of the extended classical syllogistic become At most 0 non-ps are not qs More than 0 non-ps are not qs.
These reformulations invite generalization. By the numerical syllogistic, we understand the set of English sentences of the forms At most i ps are qs More than i ps are qs At most i ps are not qs More than i ps are not qs,
where p and q are common count nouns and i is a (decimal representation of a) non-negative integer. By the extended numerical syllogistic, we understand the numerical syllogistic together with the set of quasi-English sentences of the forms
At most i non-ps are not qs More than i non-ps are not qs.
In other words, the classical syllogistic is simply the fragment of the numerical syllogistic in which all numbers are bounded by 0; and similarly for the extended variants. The first systematic investigation of the numerical syllogistic known to the author is that of De Morgan (1847, Ch. VIII), though this work was closely followed by treatments in Boole (1868) (reprinted as Boole, 1952, Sec. IV) , and Jevons (1871) (reprinted as Jevons, 1890, Part I, Sec. IV). For a historical overview of this episode in logic, see Grattan-Guinness (2000) . De Morgan presented a list of what he took to be the valid numerical syllogisms; and latter-day systems may be found in Hacker and Parry (1967) and Murphree (1998) . It can be shown, however, that there exists no sound and complete syllogism-like proof system for the numerical syllogistic, even in the presence of reductio ad absurdum; and similarly for the extended numerical syllogistic (Pratt-Hartmann, 2009 ). In addition, the satisfiability problems for the numerical syllogistic and the extended numerical syllogistic are both NPTimecomplete (Pratt-Hartmann, 2008) . Thus, the numerical syllogistic differs from the classical syllogistic in its proof-theoretic and complexity-theoretic properties. The purpose of the present paper is to locate the source of this difference more precisely. Specifically, we consider the syllogistic with unity, which we take to consist of the classical syllogistic together with the forms At most 1 p is a q More than 1 p is a q At most 1 p is not a q More than 1 p is not a q,
along with its extended variant, which additionally features the forms At most 1 non-p is not a q More than 1 non-p is not a q.
In other words, the syllogistic with unity is simply the fragment of the numerical syllogistic in which all numbers are bounded by 1; and similarly for the extended variants. The syllogistic with unity gives rise to argument patterns having no counterparts in the classical syllogistic. For example,
At most 1 o is a p At most 1 o is not a p At most 1 q is not an o More than 1 q is not an r At most 1 q is an r
is evidently a valid argument. For the first two premises ensure that there are at most two os, whence the third premise ensures that there are at most three qs; but the fourth premise states that at least two of these are not rs. Syntactically speaking, the syllogistic with unity lies closer to the classical syllogistic than it does to the numerical syllogistic, because, like the former, but unlike the latter, it features only finitely many logical forms. This fact notwithstanding, we show in the sequel that there exists no sound and complete syllogism-like proof system for the syllogistic with unity, even in the presence of reductio ad absurdum; and similarly for its extended variant. We also observe that the satisfiability problem for either of these languages remains NPTime-complete. Thus, the smallest conceivable extension of the classical syllogistic by means of additional counting quantifiers yields the proof-theoretic and complexity-theoretic properties of the entire numerical syllogistic. Generalizing this result, we consider the family of languages obtained by restricting the numerical syllogistic so that all numbers are bounded by z, where z is any positive integer; and similarly for the extended numerical syllogistic. We show that, for all these languages, there exists no sound and complete syllogism-like proof system, even in the presence of reductio ad absurdum.
The syllogistic with unity exhibits some similarities with the intriguing logical system proposed by Hamilton (1860, pp. 249-317) . According to Hamilton, the predicates of traditional syllogistic sentence-forms contain implicit existential quantifiers, so that, for example, "All p is q" is to be understood as "All p is some q". Further, these implicit existential quantifiers can be meaningfully dualized to yield novel sentence-forms, thus: "All p is all q." (A similar language was actually proposed in the earlier, but lesser-known Bentham, 1827) . Hamilton's account of the meanings of these sentences is, it must be said, unclear. However, a natural interpretation is obtained by taking the copula simply to denote the relation of identity. Thus, for example, the sentence "All p is all q" is formalized by ∀x(p(x) → ∀y(q(y) → x = y))-equivalently, either there are no ps, or there are no qs, or there is exactly 1 p and exactly 1 q, and they are identical (see, e.g. Fogelin, 1976) . Under this interpretation, the pair of Hamiltonian sentences "All p are all p" and "Some p are some p" then states that there exists exactly one p-something assertable in the syllogistic with unity. In general, however, the two languages are expressively incomparable; in particular, the Hamiltonian syllogistic provides no means of stating that exactly one p is a q (with p and q different). Moreover, they exhibit different prooftheoretic properties: unlike the syllogistic with unity, Hamilton's language does indeed have a sound and complete syllogistic proof-system, though some form of indirect proof is essential (Pratt-Hartmann, 2011) .
Syntax and semantics
Fix a countably infinite set P. We refer to any element of P as an atom. A literal is an expression of either of the forms p orp, where p is an atom. A literal which is an atom is called positive, otherwise, negative. If ℓ =p is a negative literal, then we denote byl the positive literal p. If z is a non-negative integer, an S z -formula is any expression of the forms Intuitively, we may think of the elements of P as common count-nouns, such as "pacifist", "quaker", "republican", etc., and if a ∈ ℓ A , we say that a satisfies ℓ in A, and regard a as having the property denoted by ℓ. Thus, we may gloss any negative literalp as "non-p" or "not a p" depending on grammatical context. If A is a structure, we write
we say that ϕ is true in the structure A. Thus, we may gloss ∃ ≤i (ℓ, m) as "At most i ℓs are ms", and ∃ >i (ℓ, m) as "'More than i ℓs are m". If i > 0, we write ∃ =i (ℓ, m) as an abbreviation for the pair of formulas
Where no confusion results, we occasionally treat this pair as a single formula, which we may gloss as "Exactly i ℓs are ms."
Evidently, the languages S 0 , S 1 and N formalize the classical syllogistic, the syllogistic with unity, and the numerical syllogistic, respectively; similarly, S † 0 , S † 1 and N † formalize their respective extended variants. Observe that the above semantics render formulas symmetric in their arguments: for example, A |= ∃ ≤i (ℓ, m) if and only if A |= ∃ ≤i (m, ℓ), and similarly for formulas featuring the quantifiers ∃ >i . Accordingly, we shall henceforth regard these arguments as unordered: that is, we identify the formulas ∃ ≤i (ℓ, m) and ∃ ≤i (m, ℓ), and similarly for ∃ >i . This will help to reduce notational clutter in some of the proofs.
If Θ is a set of formulas, we write A |= Θ if, for all θ ∈ Θ, A |= θ. A formula θ is satisfiable if there exists a structure A such that A |= θ; a set of formulas Θ is satisfiable if there exists A such that A |= Θ. We call a formula of the form ∃ >i (p,p) an absurdity, and use ⊥ to denote, indifferently, any absurdity. Evidently, ⊥ is unsatisfiable. If, for all structures A, A |= Θ implies A |= ψ, we say that Θ entails ψ, and write Θ |= ψ. In the case where Θ = {θ}, we say that θ entails ψ. Thus, for example, the entailment
formalizes the valid argument (9). If ϕ = ∃ ≤i (ℓ, m), we writeφ to denote ∃ >i (ℓ, m); and if ϕ = ∃ >i (ℓ, m), we writeφ to denote ∃ ≤i (ℓ, m). Thus,φ = ϕ, and, in any structure A, A |= ϕ if and only if A |=φ. Informally, we may regardφ as the negation of ϕ. It will sometimes be convenient to restrict attention to formulas featuring only a limited selection of atoms. If P ′ ⊆ P, and L is any of the languages S z or S † z , we denote the set of L-formulas ϕ involving only atoms in
, we may regard all these languages as closed under negation.
Complete sets of formulas will play an important role in the sequel, and we employ the following abbreviations to help define them. Where the language (S z or S † z ) is clear from context, and 0 ≤ i ≤ z, we write ∃ * ≤i (ℓ, m) for the set of formulas
and ∃ * >i (ℓ, m) for the set of formulas
In addition, for 0 < i ≤ z, we write ∃ * =i (ℓ, m) for the set of formulas
(Thus, in the languages S 1 and S † 1 , ∃ * =1 (ℓ, m) and ∃ =1 (ℓ, m) coincide.) It is easy to see that, for any literals ℓ, m, any structure A, and any
As mentioned above, the satisfiability problems for S 0 and S † 0 -i.e. the classical syllogistic and the extended classical syllogistic-are both NLogSpacecomplete. We end this section with a contrasting result on the complexity of satisfiability for S z and S † z , where z > 0. Theorem 2.1. For all z > 0, the problem of determining the satisfiability of a given set of S z -formulas is NPTime-complete, and similarly for S † z -formulas.
Proof. Let Φ be any satisfiable set of S † z -formulas; we claim that Φ has a model over a domain of size at most (z + 1)|Φ|. Indeed, suppose A |= Φ. For any formula ∃ >i (ℓ, m), select (i + 1) elements satisfying ℓ and m. Let B be the set of selected elements, and let B be the restriction of A to B. It is obvious that B |= Φ, and |B| ≤ (z +1)|Φ|, proving the claim. Membership of the satisfiability problem for S † z in NPTime follows. It remains to show NPTime-hardness of the satisfiability problem for S 1 . Let T be the language consisting of S 1 together with formulas of the forms ∃ ≤3 (p, p), where p is an atom. It is shown in Pratt-Hartmann (2008, Lemma 1) that the satisfiability problem for T is NPTime-hard, using a straightforward reduction of graph-3-colourability. We need only reduce the satisfiability problem for T to that for S 1 . Let Φ be any set of T -formulas, then. For any formula
′ be new atoms, and replace ϕ by the set of S 1 -formulas
Let the resulting set of S 1 -formulas be Ψ. Evidently, Ψ entails every formula of Φ; conversely, any structure A such that A |= Φ can easily be expanded to a structure A ′ such that A |= Ψ. This completes the reduction.
We remark that, when considering the satisfiability problem for S † z , the integer z is a constant: thus, there is only a fixed number of quantifiers ∃ ≤i or ∃ >i , so that we do not need to worry about the coding scheme (unary or binary) for the numerical subscripts. By contrast, for the language N † , which features all these quantifiers, the coding of numerical subscripts is a significant issue. That the satisfiability problem for N † remains in NPTime-even when numerical subscripts are coded as bit-strings-requires a clever combinatorial argument due to Eisenbrand and Shmonin (2006) ; for details, see Pratt-Hartmann (2008) .
Syllogistic proof systems
Let L be any of the languages S z or S † z (z ≥ 0). A syllogistic rule in L is a pair Θ/θ, where Θ is a finite set (possibly empty) of L-formulas, and θ an L-formula. We call Θ the antecedents of the rule, and θ its consequent. We generally display rules in 'natural-deduction' style. For example,
where p, q and o are atoms, are syllogistic rules in S 0 (hence in all larger languages); they correspond to the traditional syllogisms Darii and Ferio, respectively:
No q is an o Some p is a q Some p is not an o.
We call a syllogistic rule sound if its antecedents entail its consequent. Thus, the syllogistic rules (13) are sound. More generally, for all i, j, z (0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ z),
are sound syllogistic rules in S z (and again in all larger languages).
Let X be a set of syllogistic rules in L. A substitution is a function g : P → P; we extend g to L-formulas and to sets of L-formulas in the obvious way. An instance of a syllogistic rule Θ/θ is the syllogistic rule g(Θ)/g(θ), where g is a substitution. Denote by P(L) the set of subsets of L. We define the direct syllogistic derivation relation ⊢ X to be the smallest relation on P(L) × L satisfying:
Where the language L is clear from context, we omit reference to it; further, we typically contract syllogistic rule to rule. Instances of the relation ⊢ X can always be established by derivations in the form of finite trees in the usual way. For instance, the derivation
establishes that, for any set of syllogistic rules X containing the rules (13),
In the sequel, we reason freely about derivations in order to establish properties of derivation relations.
The derivation relation ⊢ X is said to be sound if Θ ⊢ X θ implies Θ |= θ, and complete (for L) if Θ |= θ implies Θ ⊢ X θ. (Of course, this use of the word 'complete' is unrelated to the notion of a complete set of L(P ′ )-formulas defined in Sec. 2.) Evidently, it is the existence of sound and complete derivation relations that interest us, because they would yield convenient procedures for discovering entailments such as (12). A set Θ of formulas is inconsistent (with respect to ⊢ X ) if Θ ⊢ X ⊥ for some absurdity ⊥; otherwise, consistent. It is obvious that, for any set of rules X, ⊢ X is sound if and only if every rule in X is sound.
In the sequel, we will need to consider a stronger notion of syllogistic derivation, incorporating a form of indirect reasoning. Let L be one of the languages considered above, and X a set of syllogistic rules in L. We define the indirect syllogistic derivation relation X to be the smallest relation on P(L) × L satisfying:
2. if {θ 1 , . . . , θ n }/θ is a syllogistic rule in X, g a substitution, Θ = Θ 1 ∪ · · · ∪ Θ n , and Θ i X g(θ i ) for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), then Θ X g(θ).
3. if Θ ∪ {θ} X ⊥, where ⊥ is any absurdity, then Θ Xθ .
The only difference is the addition of the final clause, which allows us to derive a formulaθ from premises Θ if we can derive an absurdity from Θ together with θ. Instances of the indirect derivation relation X may also be established by constructing derivations, except that we need a little more machinery to keep track of premises. This may be done as follows. Suppose we have a derivation (direct or indirect) showing that Θ ∪ {θ} X ⊥, for some absurdity ⊥. Let this derivation be displayed as
where θ 1 , . . . , θ n is a list of formulas of Θ (not necessarily exhaustive, and with repeats allowed). Applying Clause 3 of the definition of X , we have Θ Xθ , which we take to be established by the derivation
The tag (RAA) stands for reductio ad absurdum; the square brackets indicate that the enclosed instances of θ have been discharged, i.e. no longer count among the premises; and the numerical indexing is simply to make the derivation history clear. Note that there is nothing to prevent θ from occurring among the θ 1 , . . . , θ n ; that is to say, we do not have to discharge all (or indeed any) instances of the premise θ if we do not want to. The notions of soundness and completeness are defined for indirect derivation relations in exactly the same way as for direct derivation relations. Again, it should be obvious that, for any set of rules X, X is sound if and only if every rule in X is sound. It is important to understand that reductio ad absurdum cannot be formulated as a syllogistic rule in the technical sense defined here; rather, it is part of the proof-theoretic machinery that converts any set of rules X into the derivation relation X . It is shown in Pratt-Hartmann and Moss (2009) that, for both the classical syllogistic, S 0 , and its extension S † 0 , there exist finite sets of rules X such that the direct derivation relation ⊢ X is sound and complete. (That is: reductio ad absurdum is not needed.) However, the same paper considers various extensions of the classical syllogistic for which there are sound and complete indirect syllogistic derivation relations, but no sound and complete direct ones. Thus, it is in general important to distinguish these two kinds of proof systems. We show below that neither S z nor S † z has even a sound and complete indirect syllogistic proof system, for all z > 0.
We end this section with two simple results on syllogistic derivations.
Lemma 3.1. Let L be any of the languages S z or S † z (z ≥ 0), X a set of syllogistic rules in L, and P ′ a non-empty subset of P. Let θ ∈ L(P ′ ) and Θ ⊆ L(P ′ ). If there is a derivation (direct or indirect ) of θ from Θ using X, then there is such a derivation involving only the atoms of P ′ . Further, if there is a derivation of an absurdity from Θ, then there is a derivation of an absurdity
Proof. Given a derivation of θ from Θ, uniformly replace any atom not in P ′ with one that is. Similarly for the second statement.
Lemma 3.2. Let L be any of the languages S z or S † z (z ≥ 0), and X a set of syllogistic rules in L. Let P ′ ⊆ P be non-empty, and Ψ a complete set of
Proof. Suppose that there is an indirect derivation of some absurdity ⊥ from Ψ, using the rules X. By Lemma 3.1, we may assume all formulas involved are in L(P ′ ). Let the number of applications of (RAA) employed in this derivation be k; and assume without loss of generality that ⊥ is chosen so that this number k is minimal. If k > 0, consider the last application of (RAA) in this derivation, which derives a formula, say,ψ, discharging a premise ψ. Then there is an (indirect) derivation of some absurdity ⊥ ′ from Ψ ∪ {ψ}, employing fewer than k applications of (RAA). By minimality of k, ψ ∈ Ψ, and so, by the completeness of Ψ,ψ ∈ Ψ. But then we can replace our original derivation ofψ with the trivial derivation, so obtaining a derivation of ⊥ from Ψ with fewer than k applications of (RAA), a contradiction. Therefore, k = 0, or, in other words, Ψ ⊢ X ⊥.
Let n ≥ 4, and let P n be a subset of P of cardinality 4n + 2: we shall write P n = {p 0 , . . . , p 2n−1 , q 0 , . . . , q 2n+1 }. Now let Γ n be the set of S † 1 (P n )-formulas given in (14)- (34), which, for perspicuity, we divide into groups. (Recall that the arguments of formulas are taken to be unordered.) The first group concerns the literals p i only:
The second group concerns the literals q i only:
The third group mixes the literals p i and q i :
In fact, the formulas that will be doing most of the work here are (14), (16), (21), (30) and (31). The others are required only to ensure that we have a complete set of formulas. Proof. Consider first any formula of S † 1 (P n ) whose arguments are {p i , p j } (0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n−1). Since the conditions on i and j in (14)- (17) are clearly exhaustive (taking account of the fact that the arguments of formulas are unordered), we see that Γ n contains one of ∃ ≤0 (p i , p j ) or ∃ >0 (p i , p j ), and one of ∃ ≤1 (p i , p j ) or ∃ >1 (p i , p j ). The other argument-patterns are dealt with similarly. The second part of the lemma is ensured by the condition (i = j) in the sets of formulas (19) and (24). (14): For 0 ≤ i ≤ 2t − 2, a satisfies the atoms p i and p i+1 , whereas a ′ does not; for 2t ≤ i ≤ 2n − 2, a ′ satisfies the atoms p i and p i+1 , whereas a does not; for i = 2t − 1, neither a nor a ′ satisfies (both) these atoms, but then Γ n t replaces ∃ >0 (p 2t−1 , p 2t ) by ∃ ≤0 (p 2t−1 , p 2t ). It remains to check that no other element satisfies these atoms. The only danger is from b i ′ ,j ′ and b (21): For 0 ≤ i ≤ 2t − 2, a satisfies the atoms q i and q i+1 , whereas a ′ does not; for 2t + 2 ≤ i ≤ 2n, a ′ satisfies the atoms q i and q i+1 , whereas a does not; for i = 2t, both a and a ′ satisfy (both) these atoms, but then Γ n t replaces ∃ ≤1 (q 2t , q 2t+1 ) by ∃ >1 (q 2t , q 2t+1 ). It remains to check that no other element satisfies these atoms. Considering the right-hand column of Table 1 (26): For 0 ≤ i ≤ 2t − 2, a satisfies the atoms p i+1 and q i , whereas a ′ does not; for 2t ≤ i ≤ 2n − 2, a ′ satisfies the atoms p i+1 and q i , whereas a does not. We check that no other element satisfies these atoms. Considering the right-hand column of Table 1 (27): For 0 ≤ i ≤ 2t − 1, a satisfies the atoms p i and q i+1 , whereas a ′ does not; for 2t ≤ i ≤ 2n − 1, a ′ satisfies the atoms p i and q i+1 , whereas a does not. We check that no other element satisfies these atoms. Considering the right-hand column of Table 1 Table 1 rule these combinations of indices out.
Element name index conditions atoms satisfied
(28): For 0 ≤ i ≤ 2t − 2, a satisfies the atoms p i and q i+3 , whereas a ′ does not; for 2t ≤ i ≤ 2n − 2, a ′ satisfies the atoms p i and q i+3 , whereas a does not. We check that no other element satisfies these atoms. Considering the right-hand column of Table 1 The key step in the proof is to show that, for any finite set of sound syllogistic rules, we can make n sufficiently large that those rules cannot be used to infer anything new from Γ n . For suppose X is a finite set of sound rules in S † 1 . Let r be the maximum number of premises in any rule in X, and let n ≥ r + 4.
Proof. Consider any derivation establishing that Γ n ⊢ X θ. By Lemma 3.1, we may assume that that derivation features only atoms in P n . We show by induction on the number of steps (proof-rule instances) in the derivation that θ ∈ Γ n . If there are no steps, then θ ∈ Γ n by definition. Otherwise, consider the last proof rule instance, and let its antecedents be Θ. Thus, |Θ| ≤ n − 4; moreover, since the elements of Θ have shorter derivations than θ, Θ ⊆ Γ n , by inductive hypothesis. Now consider the formulas ∃ >0 (p 2h−1 , p 2h ), ∃ >0 (p 2h−2 , p 2h+1 ), ∃ ≤1 (q 2h , q 2h+1 ), where 1 ≤ h ≤ n − 2; and let us arrange these formulas on a rectangular grid, thus:
· · · ∃ >0 (p 2n−6 , p 2n−3 ) ∃ ≤1 (q 2 , q 3 ) ∃ ≤1 (q 4 , q 5 ) · · · ∃ ≤1 (q 2n−4 , q 2n−3 )
Since |Θ| ≤ n− 4, we can find two columns in this grid which do not intersect Θ: in other words, there exist two values of h (1 ≤ h ≤ n−2) such that Θ ⊆ Γ We now complete the proof of the theorem. Pick any absurdity ⊥. By Claim 4.2, ⊥ ∈ Γ n , and so, by Claim 4.6, Γ n ⊢ X ⊥. By Lemma 3.2, Γ n X ⊥. Yet, Γ n |= ⊥, by Claim 4.3. Thus, X is not complete, as required. For S 1 , simply delete from Γ n and Γ n t all formulas not in that language, and define B n t as before. Since the formulas (14), (16), (21), (30) and (31) 
